The question of how a dictionary should differ from an encyclopedia was posed by the Very Rev. Richard Chenevix Trench, the Dean of Westminster, on November 19, 1857, when he read Part II of his treatise On the Deficiencies of Our English Dictionaries to a meeting of the Philological Society (Trench 1857) . As is well known, that treatise laid the foundation for building A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (NED)-which became the The Oxford English Dictionary (OED), still the most authoritative dictionary of the English language. The encyclopedia question surfaced late in Trench's inventory of deficiencies. It was, as he himself noted, more a matter of superfluity than deficiency-what we might now call TMI: Too Much Information. "Our Dictionaries err in redundancy as well as defect. A Dictionary ought to know its own limits, not merely as to what it should include, but also what it should exclude" (Trench 1857, 44-45) . For too long editorial indiscriminateness had produced not Dictionaries of words only, but of persons, places, things; they are gazetteers, mythologies, scientific encyclopedias, and a hundred things more; all, of course, most imperfectly, even according to the standard of knowledge of their own time, and with a selection utterly capricious of what they put in, and what they leave out. (Trench 1857, 45 ; emphasis added) 1 Trench would exclude such persons, places, and things to make a dictionary "of words only." And James A. H. Murray, who became the general editor of the NED, would echo this sentiment in his preface to the first volume: "a Dictionary of the English Language is not a Cyclopaedia: the Cyclopaedia describes things; the Dictionary explains words, and deals with the description of things only so far as is necessary in order to fix the exact significations and uses of words" (Murray 1888, vi) .
Trench was not the first to raise the question of where to draw the line in lexicography. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott had addressed it with somewhat less certainty in preparing A Greek-English Lexicon, Based on the German work of Francis Passow (1843) . In their preface Liddell and Scott expressed some discomfort with the question, which they inherited from Passow:
Many may be surprised to find details of Mythology under some words, as 'AπÓλλων, Ζεύς, etc. These are retained from Passow, though curtailed. If the Dictionary of Mythology and Biography, lately begun under Dr. Smith's direction, had been finished, we might probably have cancelled them altogether. 2 Some Proper Names will be found. Passow had inserted all the Homeric and Hesiodic names. We have left such only as had in themselves some force and significance, or presented anything remarkable in their grammatical forms. [Note omitted] In all these last mentioned cases it is difficult to draw a line between what is essential to general Lexicography and what is not. We have done this to the best of our judgment, and if the line waves more or less, we must shelter ourselves under the plea that it could hardly be otherwise. (Liddell and Scott, ix; original emphasis) Passow himself had been less apologetic, rejecting "geographical, mythological, and historical words" accumulated by some of his own lexicographical predecessors (Aarsleff, 254, citing Passow) . Implicit in Passow's and Liddell and Scott's concerns was the scholastic distinction between real definition on the one hand and nominal definition on the other, which dated back to Plato. 3 The proper object of lexicography was not the things of the world, real or cultural, but the words.
Liddell and Scott commended Passow's historical approach to lexicography: "Our Plan has been that marked out and begun by Passow, viz. , to make each Article a History of the usage of the word referred to" (vii; original emphasis). Trench recommended the same approach: the new English dictionary that he called for should "present us with the history of words, the significant phases of meaning through which they have travelled" (34). 4 Liddell, as a delegate to the Oxford University Press, gave significant support to Murray's project to build the NED on historical principles (Murray 1977, 230) . And Murray, like Liddell and Scott, was sometimes uncertain where to draw the line between lexicography and encyclopedism.
The most pressing problem that Murray faced in this regard concerned the lexicographical status of scientific terminology. Trench was sure that a dictionary should not be a "scientific encyclopedia." Lynda Mugglestone has ascribed Trench's dislike of scientific terminology to a clerical suspicion of secular ambition, evident in the conflict of "Genesis and geology" that was leading up to the crisis of Darwin's Origin of Species (Mugglestone, . Trench preferred to document the progress of Literature and to sideline the rise of Science. In this he had Liddell's support (Mugglestone, 124) , but he did not fully persuade Murray, who welcomed into the pages of the NED a selection of the more prominent terms of ancient and modern science. Indeed, at the start of the section on "The Vocabulary" in his preface to the NED Murray went so far as to compare the lexicographer to "the astronomer" and to "the zoologist or botanist" in their common perplexity of information-overload management. "The lexicographer must, like the naturalist, 'draw the line somewhere'" (Murray 1888, xvii) . If lexicography was a kind of science, as these analogies suggested-and indeed the Proposal, drafted with Trench's cooperation, had looked to "the compilation of a new and more Scientific Dictionary than any at present existing" (Philological Society, Proposal, 1)-then the "scientific encyclopedia" should not be so alien to that project as Trench supposed.
In addition to the question of what words to admit to the dictionary, which we have just considered, 5 Trench expressed his lexical bias as regards another important aspect: the question of how they should be treated. Here his remarks, though obliquely put forward, carry considerable momentum. The immediate target is the treatment of cultural, not scientific, terminology:
As an English Dictionary ought not to include the technical words of different sciences, as little ought it to attempt to supply the place of popular treatises on the different branches of human knowledge; it must everywhere preserve the line firm and distinct between itself and an encyclopedia. Let the quotations yield as much information as they can be made to yield, in subordination to their primary purpose, which is, to illustrate the word, and not to tell us about the thing; and in the due and happy selection of these, so as, if possible, to combine both objects, the lexicographer may display eminent skill. (Trench 1857, 49; original emphases) Here Trench addresses the function of illustrative quotation, not nominal definition as such; but in this discussion the one is pretty much a proxy for the other. Charles Richardson built his New Dictionary of the English Language (1838) almost entirely out of copious illustrative quotations, supplemented with speculative etymologies and rudimentary definitions. And Trench's enthusiasm for documentation-by-illustrative-quotation-documentation that would eventually become the bedrock of the NED-was encouraged by Richardson's work. 6 Note that, in the final sentence of the passage quoted above, although Trench clearly prioritizes what might be called nominal illustration (of "the word") over real illustration (of "the thing"), he nonetheless recommends a judicious combination of both. He does not elaborate on this optimal compromise. Apparently illustrating the thing may be a happy bonus achieved in the main task of illustrating the word. Trench does not consider whether the word can be illustrated-or defined, for that matter-without taking into account the thing.
conflate the questions of what and how (262 and 364-65), but those are different aspects of the question of encyclopedism. For example, camel might pass muster as a word and yet still be over-explained as a thing (as will appear below). 6 Trench's heavily annotated copy of Richardson's Dictionary, now in the collection of the Lilly Library at Indiana University, is described in detail by Michael Adams (2018).
Trench concludes this paragraph by cautioning against encyclopedic profusion either "from the compiler's own pen [that is, from the definitions], or from books which have no character of literature about them [that is, from indiscriminately chosen illustrative quotations], of the plants, fruits, flowers, precious stones, animals, and the rest, whose names find place in his columns" (49). Johnson was bad enough in this respect: "He might well have spared us thirteen closely printed lines on an opal, nineteen on a rose, twenty-one on the almug-tree, as many on the airpump, not fewer on the natural history of the armadillo, and rather more than sixty on the pear" (49-50). Worse yet, "all this is repeated by Todd [who edited Johnson 1818] ; and in an exaggerated form by Webster, from whom, for instance, we may learn of the camel, that it constitutes the riches of the Arabian, that it can sustain abstinence from drink for many days, and in all, twenty-five lines of its natural history. Richardson is entirely free from this fault" (Trench 1860, 61) .
The sentence commending Richardson's virtue in this respect was a gesture that Trench added to the second edition of his treatise. He may not have checked Richardson's camel entry before he did so; if he had, he would have learned from the several quotations that Richardson displayed there such propositions as that "it is easyer for a camel to go throughe the eye of a nedle, than for a rich manne to enter "the kyngdome of God"; and also that there are two kinds of camels, "the Bactrians," which "haue two bunches upon their backes," and "the Arabicke," which have "but one apeece there, but they haue another upon their breast, whereupon they rest and lie" (Richardson, 1: 256) . Surely such details "culled from books" (in this case the Bible and Pliny) do transgress "the line firm and distinct between [a dictionary] and an encyclopedia." Matters are indeed worse in Webster, who with "his own pen" (that is, in his definition of the word camel) avers, among other things, that "camels constitute the riches of an Arabian, without which he could neither subsist, carry on trade nor travel over sandy desarts. Their milk is his common food" (Webster 1828, 1: n.p.) (Lilley, 22; 256, noting Fitch' s authorship of the review). Though Fitch, like Trench, believed that "it is, after all, the main function of a dictionary to define words, and not to describe things" (Fitch, 97 ) the names of things did present a puzzle:
We have to decide between definition and description, unless we choose to refer the thing signified to some vague and uncertain type. Yet if we define, we give little notice to the reader of the thing designated; if we describe, we make our book an encyclopaedia; if we refer the thing to some given type, we make synonyms of words which signify very different things. . . . every lexicographer will be in danger of gross error, when attempting anything like a satisfactory explanation of those words which are but the names and signs of things. His business is to define the name, subject to the condition that it shall denote the thing. But this is frequently no easy task. A name may often be very carefully defined, and yet the definition shall be wholly insufficient to enable the student to identify it with the corresponding thing. Or, again, the thing may be very accurately described, and yet the word be, after all, not defined. (96-97) The desired "line firm and distinct" was not easy to draw.
In Decades before he joined the Philological Society, Trench did contemplate exigent criteria for adequate definition. The first sentence of the first chapter of his popular book Notes on the Parables of Our Lordthe chapter titled "On the Definition of the Parable"-reads: "Those writers who have had occasion to define a parable [note omitted] do not appear to have found it an easy task to give such a satisfying definition as should omit none of its distinguishing marks, and yet at the same time include nothing that was superfluous and merely accidental" (Trench 1847, [1] ). 9 The logic here is that of necessary and sufficient conditions, derived ultimately from Aristotle's distinction between essence and accidence. For discussions of the waning importance of necessary and sufficient conditions in lexicography (thanks to Wittgenstein, prototype semantics, and corpus linguistics), see Hanks 1987; Hanks 2013, 86-87; and Hanks 2016 . In the passage quoted above Trench acknowledges constraints imposed by those conditions. However, it should be noted that the phrase necessary and sufficient had not yet become a hallmark of lexicography-though it was a term of art in mathematics, and commonly used also in the law.
At the outset of Notes, Trench appears to contemplate (only to set aside as too daunting) an exercise in real definition rather than nominal definition. It is hard "to define a parable" (evidently a thing)-indeed, hard to define "the parable" (as it is named in the chapter heading). And yet the long and impressive footnote that Trench attached to the word parable in the opening sentence traces through philological evidence to the conclusion that the aspect of "comparison," proposed by etymology, "is only the accident, not of the essence of the word" (Trench 1847, equivalent to a definition, I have placed his authority as a supplement to my own" (1755, 1: C1r).
When the Philological Society published its Proposal for the Publication of a New English Dictionary by the Philological Society (1859) it prompted volunteers who would gather illustrative quotations to be on the alert for "all passages which contain definitions or explanations"-later called "passages which contain happy definitions or explanations" (6, 9). The organizers, including Trench, who was one of three members of the Literary and Historical Committee (2), also would "gladly receive . . . any well-considered definitions of words" (7), but did not say what one should look like. 9 The first edition (not seen) was Trench 1841. By the ninth edition, published a few years before "Deficiencies," Trench had slightly rephrased this opening sentence without altering the distinctive criteria (Trench 1864, [1] ).
[1], emphasis added; so also Trench 1864, [1] ). At least at this moment (a moment that was sustained over several decades, in many editions of his book) Trench casually merges the definition of the thing into the definition of the word-always honoring, however, the concept of necessary and sufficient conditions. When Trench discussed proverbs (not parables, but something similar) in lectures before "young men's societies at Portsmouth and elsewhere" he acknowledged again that definition was a difficult business: "Nothing is harder than a definition. While on the one hand there is no easier task than to find a fault or flaw in the definitions of those who have gone before us, nothing on the other is more difficult than to propose one of our own, which shall not also present a vulnerable side" (Trench 1853, 7) . In the discussion that follows, Trench relies on "the rigorous requirements of a definition" (7) to fault one proffered definition of proverb (evidently the thing, not the word) because "it . . . errs . . . both in defect and excess" (8)-that is, the conditions adduced by the definition are neither sufficient nor necessary. (A structurally similar dialectic of inadequacy and superfluity shaped Trench's "Deficiencies" lectures, as he tallied both lexicographic deficiencies and encyclopedic superfluities to find that the available English dictionaries were in many respects neither sufficient nor necessary.) When he speculates on the etymology of proverb (15), Trench attends to the word, but in the service of defining the thing.
In 1860 the Philological Society published, under the title Canones Lexicographici, its rules for constructing the New English Dictionary. Those rules were prepared by a committee of eight men, with "The Very Rev. the Dean of Westminster" heading the credits on the title page. Part III, which prescribed "The Arrangement of each Article," listed as an ingredient "The Definition"-but it gave no details (Philological Society, Canones, 6). The silence here seems the more remarkable following upon detailed advice about how to set out an etymology. And when Murray wrote his preface to the NED, though he had much to say about the scope and limits of the relevant "Vocabulary," he said little enough about definition as such-under the rubric "The Signification (Sematology)." We learn there that a word will often have many "senses," which will be displayed in chronological order; that "the explanations of the meanings have been framed anew" from the archive of illustrative quotations; and that the "explanations" of previous lexicographers (Johnson, Todd, Bailey) , which constitute "the most successfully cultivated department of English lexicography, have not been neglected" (Murray 1888, xi-xii; original emphasis) .
Note that Murray speaks here of explanations of the senses of a word, not definitions. Although the terms could be used synonymously (as indeed in the first epigraph to the present article), they carry different connotations, which may distinguish lexical from encyclopedic information. Etymology suggests that an ex-planation flattens-out, unfolds, and broadens information, but that de-finition narrows information within limits. Either could apply to either words or things, but explanations may favor things, or how people use words to talk about things. (The latter is the rationale that Hanks 1987 sets out for preferring explanation to definition.) In his retrospective lecture The Evolution of English Lexicography (1900), Murray mentioned explanation more than twice as often as definition (22 to 9, counting cognate forms); and he did not give a precise account of definition. Johnson, too, had shown a preference for "explanation" over "definition," expressing an interest in things (McLaverty). Near the end of his own preface Murray quotes from Johnson's preface, in which Johnson acknowledged an early ambition to master information about things as well as words:
When first I engaged in this work, I resolved to leave neither words nor things unexamined, and pleased myself with a prospect of the hours which I should revel away in feasts of literature, with the obscure recesses of northern learning which I should enter and ransack; the treasures with which I expected every search into those neglected mines to reward my labour, and the triumph with which I should display my acquisitions to mankind. When I had thus enquired into the original of words, I resolved to show likewise my attention to things; to pierce deep into every science, to enquire the nature of every substance of which I inserted the name, to limit every idea by a definition strictly logical, and exhibit every production of art or nature in an accurate description, that my book might be in place of all other dictionaries whether appellative or technical. Johnson's double ambition was to provide a history of the meanings of words and also to describe the nature of things. The former task was lexical ("appellative"), the latter, encyclopedic ("technical").
10 Next in the same paragraph Johnson had to acknowledge that the grand scale of these ambitions was too grand to accomplish. However, it is the limitless scale of the project, not its nature, that frustrated his efforts. The fundamental idea that things as well as words were matters of lexicographical interest escapes his apologetic criticism. In the end, things figured prominently in his dictionary, which is indeed "partly an encyclopedia," presenting "a general round of knowledge" (DeMaria 19, 38) .
Murray implicitly endorsed Johnson's double ambition: "If the present writer has been more successful than Dr. Johnson in finding what he searched for, it has been owing to the ready good-will and helpful co-operation of many scholars and specialists" (Murray 1888, xii) . Those "scholars" and "specialists" were presumably "appellative" (philological) and "technical" (scientific), respectively. Even Trench, in the passage quoted above, looked to "combine both objects" (that is, illustrating the word and the thing) in displaying happily chosen quotations.
A reader of the NED who sought more detailed information about what a definition might involve must turn from Murray's preface to the body of that work, particularly the articles for Define and Definitionarticles that Murray himself edited (he was responsible for the letter D among others). There we learn that define means: The definition of Definition is structured similarly, with a similar disclaimer regarding Johnson.
These disclaimers, though not unique to these entries, are disquieting in this context. A later authority than Johnson, John Stuart Mill, does get quoted as regards the verb Define, and appropriately so; he devoted a whole chapter to Definition in his System of Logic, which had reached its third edition by 1851. The quoted passage from that book in this NED entry is incidental, not part of that chapter. However, the NED did quote from Mill's chapter on definition, but in the article for another word, Adequate, where his words illustrated a technical sense of the term in logic, "fully answering to, or representing": "The only adequate definition of a term is . . . one which declares the facts" (Murray 1888, 108) . This quotation was truncated by Murray for convenience, and it is convenient here also to quote from the passage more fully, as it sheds useful light on what might be called the pragmatics of dictionary use, a topic to which I shall return at the end. Mill's comments are instructive:
The only adequate definition of a name is, as already remarked, one which declares the facts, and the whole of the facts, which the name involves in its signification. But with most persons the object of a definition does not embrace so much; they look for nothing more, in a definition, than a guide to the correct use of the term-a protection against applying it in a manner inconsistent with custom and convention. Anything, therefore, is to them a sufficient definition of a term, which will serve as a correct index to what the term denotes; though not embracing the whole, and sometimes, perhaps, not even any part, of what it connotes. (Mill 1843, 1: 187-88) A few pages later Mill quotes approvingly from remarks that he first penned while reviewing Richard Whately's logic textbook in 1828:
The distinction between nominal and real definitions, between definitions of words and what are called definitions of things, though conformable to the ideas of most of the Aristotelian logicians, cannot, as it appears to us, be maintained. We apprehend that no definition is ever intended to "explain and unfold the nature of a thing." It is some confirmation of our opinion, that none of those writers who have thought that there were definitions of things, have ever succeeded in discovering any criterion by which the definition of a thing can be distinguished from any other proposition relating to the thing. The definition, they say, unfolds the nature of the thing: but no definition can unfold its whole nature; and every proposition in which any quality whatever is predicated of the thing, unfolds some part of its nature.
The true state of the case we take to be this. All definitions are of names, and of names only: but, in some definitions, it is clearly apparent, that nothing is intended except to explain the meaning of the word; while in others, besides explaining the meaning of the word, it is intended to be implied that there exists a thing, corresponding to the word. . . .
There are, therefore, expressions, commonly passing for definitions, which include in themselves more than the mere explanation of the meaning of a term. But it is not correct to call an expression of this sort a peculiar kind of definition. Its difference from the other kind consists in this, that it is not a definition, but a definition and something more. (Mill 1843 , 1: 195-96, quoting from Mill 1828 According to Mill, the ancient distinction between nominal definition (definition of words) and real definition (definition of things) collapses: only nominal definition is definition, "real definition" just being nominal definition with the super-addition of some propositional behavior asserting the existence of a certain thing.
One might object that in executing this maneuver Mill indulges in a fit of stipulative definition.
11 But at least in doing so he anticipates and theorizes what would become Trench's relatively untheoretical preference for nominal definition over real definition. In proposing to collapse the distinction Mill ironically reinforces its values.
Others have patrolled the distinction with more rigor than Trench. Indeed, in the past half century the dictionary/encyclopedia border has been hotly contested ground in the philosophy of language and linguistic theory. Stephen P. Schwartz has made a strong case that natural-kind names (for example, gold, water, tiger) 11 Robinson criticizes Mill's restriction on one possible reading: "Mills's statement that 'no definition is ever intended to "explain and unfold the nature of a thing"' [note omitted] would be grossly false if taken as an account of the past usage of the word" (10). However, Robinson concludes his own analysis, after exploding the concept of "real definition" into a dozen unrelated concepts, by preferring to "confine the term 'definition' to nominal definitions" (190)-much as Mill would do. Part of the initial problem is "that nominal definition is hard to keep distinct from real definition" (24).
have no definitions in the traditional sense. . . . There is no meaning dimension in the case of many natural kind terms. The only dimension is empirical. . . . we should not expect to discover necessary characteristics of, say, gold by analyzing the use of the term gold. (Schwartz, 301, 304) Schwartz does not mention dictionaries or encyclopedias, but the line that he draws here is their dividing line-which, as he positions it, favors the latter. Similarly D. Alan Cruse asserts, "natural kind names, such as cat, horse, crocodile, and kangaroo, have no definitions" (Cruse, 80) . And Considine, having actual dictionaries and encyclopedias in mind, makes the same point, that "it is difficult to find purely lexical information about words like arsenic, about the names of things. A lexicographer must resolve to provide some real-world information about their denotanda" (Considine 2005, 199) . In a bilingual dictionary "some degree of encyclopedic information is necessary," according to Ladislav Zgusta, who also notes that in the OED "Murray occasionally is not averse to some discrete encyclopedic information" (Zgusta, 243, 76) . "It is well known that the boundary between (linguistic) explanation . . . and encyclopedic information about the things denoted by the respective words is a fuzzy one" (243). Certainly camel crossed that boundary in the NED-and it still lodges there, verbatim, in the OED Online:
A large hornless ruminant quadruped, distinguished by its humped back, long neck, and cushioned feet; it is nowhere found wild, but is domesticated in Western Asia and Northern Africa, in the arid regions of which it is the chief beast of burden.
There are two distinct species, the Arabian or one-humped, and the Bactrian or two-humped; a lighter and fleeter variety of the former is known as the Dromedary.
12
Participants in the debate sometimes acknowledge that the terms dictionary and encyclopedia figure in their disputes not literally-not, that is, with reference to actual dictionaries and encyclopedias (as Considine and Zgusta understood), but rather to ideal entities that are supposed to provide ordinary speakers of a language with the wherewithal to stage their meanings in language use. 13 Under some accounts a speaker will possess a kernel of conceptual information sufficient to inform the use of a word (lexical information, registered in a mental lexicon or dictionary), plus a supplemental store of real-world information (encyclopedic information) sufficient to nuance that use in certain material contexts. For example, Anna Wierzbicka has been tireless in generating a database of irreducible lexical qualities that are supposed to inform certain words, and hostile to any suggestion that such data are implicated in nonessential information. She would defend the line between dictionary and encyclopedia from the side of the dictionary: "The mind itself draws a distinction between a 'mental dictionary' and a 'mental enyclopaedia,'" and "words can be rigorously defined."
14 She asks, "Can a line be drawn in a non-arbitrary fashion between a fully spelled out concept bicycle and encyclopedic knowledge about bicycles, external to the concept as such?"-and the answer is apparently positive (Wierzbicka 1985, 113) . On the other hand, John Haiman has been celebrated (and criticized) for proposing that the actual content of purely lexical information is null and tautological, ceding the whole of semantic competence to the domain of encyclopedic knowledge (Haiman 1980 ; see also Haiman 1982) . William Frawley undertook to deconstruct Haiman's critique, restoring the line between dictionary and encyclopedia (Frawley 1981) . His account is treated with considerable respect in the detailed review of the dictionary/encyclopedia controversy in linguistics that Bert Peeters prefixed to a collection of articles on the topic, The Lexicon-Encyclopedia Interface (Peeters 2000, 12-13) . As Haiman and Frawley both observe from their distinct perspectives, because the lexicon/encyclopedia distinction engages many other key distinctions in linguistic theory (for example, essence vs. accidence, semantics vs. pragmatics, proper names vs. common names), the lexicon/ 13 ". . . one must distinguish between the opposition dictionary/encyclopedia as it is intended in the publishing world and the same opposition as conceived in semiotic or philosophical terms" (Eco, 47 ; part of chapter 2, "Dictionary vs. Encyclopedia," 46-86). Eco concludes the same paragraph by asserting that "if so-called encyclopedias are in some way encyclopedic [in the semiotic and philosophical sense of the term], so-called dictionaries are rather impoverished encyclopedias." See also Aitchison, 58, citing Katz and Fodor 1963; and Atkins, 24. 14 Wierzbicka 1995, 289, 290 . For a list of many of Wierzbicka's contributions to the discussion see 314-15. encyclopedia border has been tested at one time or another by a host of prominent linguists.
The difference between lexical and encyclopedic information was a matter of practical concern when Philip B. Gove and his colleagues prepared Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961) . In 1954 Gove (presumably it was he) circulated "a directive" that traced with increasing alarm the efflorescence of encyclopedic information in American and British dictionaries from 1828 onward, culminating in the ten volumes of The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia: An Encyclopedic Lexicon of the English Language and a Pronouncing and Etymological Dictionary of Names in Geography, Biography, Mythology, History, Art, Etc., Etc. (1889-91;  Gove displays the title in full [106] ). Although such competition had encouraged Merriam-Webster to freight their unabridged dictionary with extensive encyclopedic information up through the second edition of 1934 (Neilson) , the third edition could not sustain such proliferation while also making room for "50,000 new words and 50,000 new senses of old words" (Gove 1985, 103) . Gove responded to this crisis by proscribing altogether or sharply restricting more than two dozen kinds of information that were previously indulged but were now stigmatized; these included "The Gazetteer section"; "The Biographical section"; "Mottoes, proverbs, famous sayings"; and a large variety of proper names, such as As You Like It, Mother Hubbard, Boston, Boer War, and Old Ironsides.
In managing this change, Gove reported, evidently with tongue in cheek, the stipulation of a new meaning for the word nonlexical. That word had been in occasional use since the nineteenth century, evidently with one or another sense in casual and academic contexts. However, it did not earn a place in Webster's Second, not even in the long list of words that were dispatched en masse in the article about the prefix non-(Nielsen, 1660-62). It did achieve entry into Webster's Third, where it was defined simply as: "not lexical" (Gove 1961 (Gove , rpt. 1981 (Gove , 1537 . Evidently the word nonlexical was a tabula rasa, open to doodling. And so Gove confessed, stipulated, and began to banish:
The word nonlexical has been compounded, adopted, and manipulated arbitrarily as expedient editorial jargon to cover in its broadest sense all matter not accepted for inclusion in
[the] 3rd ed. Timetables of the nation's transportation systems, dividend records of stocks listed on the exchange, analysis of Leonardo da Vinci's anatomism, and the letter-sequence dlub should be readily acceptable as nonlexical . . . . Anyone, however, who makes an unconsidered attempt to add to these four examples is likely to come up with something that has already been included in one of our own (or similar) dictionaries-or proposed for inclusion. (1985, 104) .
Gove elaborated on this stipulated meaning of nonlexical in a paragraph that drew a significant distinction:
For practicable purposes all this matter now to be omitted and therefore to be considered nonlexical in its broadest sense comes into critical question in two forms: either (1) as a term to go in or out as a definiendum or (2) as information to become part of the definiens. Any term omitted entirely will be called nonlexical in a narrow sense; information deleted or withheld from an entered term will be called encyclopedic. (1985, 110) Gove's memo, or directive (incorporated into his 1985 article), focused on the need to exclude nonlexical terms "as a definiendum," and paid just this slight attention to what is arguably the more interesting question of deleting or withholding encyclopedic information from the definition of a term. Gove does not suggest that all encyclopedic information should be, or could be, "deleted or withheld" from a lexical definition (as has already been suggested, that might be impossible); but, like Trench (whom he does not mention), he would be happy to see less of it.
Gove published this memo in a scholarly journal after Webster's Third had been given a rough reception in the press, mainly because it adopted a descriptivist approach to usage but also because some reviewers regretted the curtailment of encyclopedic information that they had come to expect in an unabridged dictionary (Gove 1965; Morton; Sledd and Ebbitt) .
As a practical matter the nonlexical (in Gove's special jargon) could be systematically purged and exiled (goodbye to Old Ironsides), but the encyclopedic was hard to contain. The definitions in Webster's Third of the terms arsenic, camel, and gold all have a strong encyclopedic flavor, as they must; and sometimes the encyclopedic aspect becomes overwhelming, as in this definition of hotel:
A building of many rooms chiefly for overnight accommodation of transients and several floors served by elevators, usu. with a large open street-level lobby containing easy chairs, with a variety of compartments for eating, drinking, dancing, exhibitions, and group meetings (as of salesmen or convention attendants), with shops having both inside and street-side entrances and offering for sale items (as clothes, gifts, candy, theater tickets, travel tickets) of particular interest to a traveler, or providing personal services (as hairdressing, shoe shining), and with telephone booths, writing tables, and washrooms freely available. (Gove 1961 (Gove , rpt.1981 (Gove , 1093 Too Much Information! Zgusta aptly called this "an extreme case of encyclopedicity" (118).
Kory Stamper, who once wrote definitions for Merriam-Webster, quotes this "now infamous" definition in Word by Word: The Secret Life of Dictionaries (Stamper 119) , her recent account of the business of dictionaries. Earlier in that book (94) she reports that lexicographers try their best to honor the distinction between "lexical defining" (about the kernel of word meaning, which does belong in the dictionary) and "real defining" (about all the real-world associated facts about a thing, which belong elsewhere). She notes that the hotel definition is now looking old: "Dancing compartments! Travel tickets! Candy! Where are these hotels today?" (119). She might add that it did not result from "lexical defining." However, as she acknowledges, the typical user of a dictionary does not care or even know about such distinctions, instead often turning to the dictionary to find the meaning of something important, like love (95). So the lexicographer labors on, back against the current of dictionary use.
Suppose you are reading "The Pangolin," a poem by Marianne Moore (2017; first published in 1936) . Suppose that the word pangolin is unfamiliar to you. Suppose you are a curious student and you want to look it up. So you just Google it, as students often do, and are led immediately to a long, detailed Wikipedia article that tells you a lot about pangolins.
The first two sentences include a couple of synonymous words about the word pangolin and a great many more words about the thing:
Pangolins or scaly anteaters [note omitted] are mammals of the order Pholidota (from the Greek word φολι ς, "horny scale").The one extant family, Manidae, has three genera: Manis, which comprises four species living in Asia; Phataginus, which comprises two species living in Africa; and Smutsia, which comprises two species also living in Africa. (Note omitted)
A lot more about the thing appears in subsequent paragraphs, such as, "pangolins are threatened by poaching (for their meat and scales) and heavy deforestation of their natural habitats, and are the most trafficked mammals in the world"-a fact that Moore may not have known in 1936. Dozens of high-ranked Google hits for a search s.v. pangolin connect to articles about the pangolin's endangered-species status-displacing the link to the Wiktionary article about Pangolin many screens down in the results-to a page that few students are likely to peruse. There the Wiktionary definition is short and to the point: "The scaly anteater; any of several long-tailed, scale-covered mammals of the order Pholidota of tropical Africa and Asia, the sole extant genus of which is Manis." The proportion of nominal (synonymous) information and real information there is about the same as in the first two sentences of the Wikipedia article, although more succinctly expressed. Two adjacent pictures of pangolins-one a drawing, the other a photograph-advertise real, not nominal, aspects. Despite its binary distinction from Wikipedia, Wiktionary is apparently not an encyclopedic-information-free zone. That is, no more than the NED does Wiktionary obey Trench's injunction to "preserve the line firm and distinct between itself and an encyclopedia."
And yet there are clear differences between Wiktionary and Wikipedia. These differences, though not drawn with a conceptual "line firm and distinct," do roughly match the differential allocation of space for articles that governed the production of print dictionaries and print encyclopedias. This is a remarkable difference, given the fact that raw space constraints no longer apply to dictionaries online, as they did even for the capacious NED. Wiktionary and Wikipedia differ not as the ideal dictionary and the ideal encyclopedia should differ, but more or less as actual dictionaries and actual encyclopedias have differed in the past. There is a genre-lag effect evident here, a kind of skeuomorphism. And if you Google skeuomorphism you will quickly find a Wikipedia article about skeuomorph linked right from the first screen displayed; and then, should you persist, the Wiktionary definition of skeuomorphism several screens down: "The incorporation of obsolete or skeuomorphic elements into a design, for familiarity or out of tradition, even though they no longer serve any functional purpose."
The Wikipedia article tells us a good deal more than that, and better; so, as often, Google makes the right choice, favoring the encyclopedia and all its garrulous, real-world content over the constrained and yet, even so, not purely lexical discourse of the dictionary.
In 2007 Dirk Geeraerts assessed the relevance of cognitive semantics, especially prototype theory, for lexicography. He found that common lexicographical practice, which judiciously mixes some encyclopedic information with semantic information, often hedged by such qualifiers as typically, usually, and often, does not so much abolish the dictionary/ encyclopedia distinction as blur it in a strategic way that is warranted by the gradient structure of any prototypical conceptual array. And he not only thus justifies the mixing of modes in dictionary definitions but would also justify, in sociological and semantic terms, the difference between actual encyclopedias and actual dictionaries. That is, most encyclopedias are supposed to rely on and expound the detailed knowledge of socially sanctioned experts, whereas most desktop dictionaries would provide a tighter, more focused account of the vocabulary that enables standard linguistic competence (Geeraerts) . Perhaps; but the social warrant of intellectual expertise is only obliquely honored in Wikipedia, when it is honored at all; and even an expertly written Wikipedia article may overwhelm the casual reader with the old problem of Too Much Information. Grice's conversational maxims of Quantity apply, mutatis mutandis, to written communication as well as to faceto-face conversation. "1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice, 26) . (The fact that Grice was interested in such maxims because of how they could be violated in the service of indirect communication does not lessen their ordinary applicability.) The problem for any writer, perhaps especially for the author of a dictionary definition or an encyclopedia article, is to gauge in advance-often on the basis of Too Little Information-what it is that "the reader" needs to know. 15 And Google, which may quickly favor one or another dictionary or encyclopedia article (usually the latter) whenever we casually Google a word instead of looking it up in a dictionary, has that same problem in spades.
To mention Grice in this context is to recall his important article "Meaning" (Grice, , which, without addressing dictionaries or encyclopedias, raises questions about the stability of definition, and perhaps its purity also. If, as Grice implies, the "timeless" meaning of a word string is the abstraction or precipitate of many instances of the intentional use of that string in certain discrete utterance acts, 16 then that so-called "timeless" meaning is actually temporal and mutable, not fixed, not the pure logical result of necessary and sufficient predications, but subject to use, and (we may hazard) sometimes referential to aspects of things. "Mutability," as Johnson acknowledged with some reluctance, was the inevitable fate of language in use (1755, 1:10). The "timeless" meanings of words change. Definitions are temporary, must be brought up to date, revised from time to time. Encyclopedias will have to be updated also, as we revise our expert or crowd-sourced social constructions-that is, our explanations-of what meaningful relations obtain among the things of this world. And it can be expected that the line drawn between dictionaries and encyclopedias, as they variously expound both words and things, not being, as Trench desired, "a line firm and distinct," will rather continue, as Liddell and Scott concede in their apology, to "wave."
15 "Dictionaries should . . . remain encyclopedic . . . otherwise they would be of limited practical help to their users" (Mufwene, 1) . "The selection of entries depends very much on the compiler's sense of what is wanted, and if what is wanted occasionally violates theory, so be it. . . . it is hard to believe that the public would be better served by denying it nonlexical items in order to conform to a theoretical construct of a proper dictionary" (Landau, 359) . "It is not always easy to decide where the boundary lies between lexical and encyclopedic information . . . in any case, encyclopedic information is often of more use to the reader than a purely linguistic definition might be" (Bauer, 112) . 16 In a reversal of that process of abstraction Webster's Third, disclaiming preference for any one sense among numbered senses of a word, advises instead that "the best sense is the one that most aptly fits the context of an actual genuine utterance" (Gove 1961 , rpt. 1981 .
